INTRODUCTION
A core question for this special issue on '40 Years of Policy & Politics' is how to use experience to inform future policy. Over the years, the journal has returned frequently to the topic of public sector and public management reform. So, this article addresses matters of central concern to the journal in its anniversary year. Specifically, I ask two questions. What lessons about reforming the British civil service can be learnt from using observational methods to study British government departments? What are the strengths and weaknesses of such an approach in the reform of public administration?
Both questions are unusual in political science. First, observation is not a common research tool because of such obstacles as the addiction to secrecy of British government. As Geertz (1983, 21 ) points out, 'there has been an enormous amount of genre mixing in intellectual life' as 'social scientists have turned away from a laws and instances ideal of explanation towards a cases and interpretations one' and towards 'analogies drawn from the humanities'. Examples of such analogies include social life as game, as drama, and as text.
There is a specific problem for public administration. As we blur genres, we bring 'the social technologist notion of what a social scientist is … into question' (Geertz 1983, 35 ). Rather, the task becomes to recover the meaning of games, dramas and texts and to tease out their consequences. So, this article blurs genres, combining political science and cultural anthropology to explore civil service reform. Then, confronting the 'social technologist' issue, I ask, 'what lessons can public administration drawn from this research'? Can recovering stories provide lessons for the would-be reformer?
The article has three sections. The first, section provides a brief account of the main characteristics of public sector reform over the past decade; namely, evidence-based policy making, managerialism, and choice. The second section compares the reform proposals with the fieldwork reported in Rhodes (2011) and draws lessons for would-be reformers. I use five axioms for ease of exposition: coping and the appearance of rule, not strategic planning; institutional memory, not internal structures; storytelling, not evidence based policy; contending traditions and stories, not managerialism; the politics of implementation, not topdown innovation and control. The final section discusses the strengths and weaknesses of my approach both in the study of public administration and for public sector reform. I argue that 3 attempts to impose private sector management beliefs and techniques to increase the economy, efficiency and effectiveness have had at best variable success. I conclude we do not need more managerialism but a different approach to reform that recognizes the centrality of organizational traditions and storytelling.
THE REFORMS
This section suggests that the reforms of the civil service proposed by both think-tanks and the government over the past decade are pervaded by beliefs in the instrumental rationality of evidence-based policymaking, managerialism, and economic choice. These ideas are the shared, almost tacit, knowledge of contributors to the continuing debate about public sector reform. I will be brief because my remarks verge on the obvious.
Evidenced-based policymaking
At the heart of the Cabinet Office's (1999) 
Managerialism
Managerialism has a long history which cannot be retold here (see : Pollitt 1993) . In brief, it is a set of inherited beliefs about how private sector management techniques would increase the economy, efficiency and effectiveness -the 3Es -of the public sector. Initially the beliefs focused on managerialism or hands-on, professional management; explicit standards and measures of performance; managing by results; and value for money. Subsequently, it also embraced marketization or neo-liberal beliefs about competition and markets. It introduced ideas about restructuring the incentive structures of public service provision through contracting-out, quasimarkets; and consumer choice. New Labour introduced a third strand to managerialism with its service delivery agenda. 
Delivery and choice
The general principles informing the delivery agenda were outlined by Michael Barber, the Prime Minister's former Chief Adviser on Delivery in his comments about education:
Essentially it's about creating different forms of a quasi-market in public services, exploiting the power of choice, competition, transparency and incentives. (Interview with Michael Barber 13 January 2006; see also Barber 2007, chapter 3; and PASC 2005) .
Despite the brouhaha about its novelty, the Coalition government also focused on service delivery and customer. Although evidence-based policy making and managerialism remain prominent strands in the Coalition's reform proposals, choice is the first principle of the reforms; 'wherever possible we are increasing choice by giving people direct control over the services they use' (Cameron 2011) . The White Paper claims that 'the old centralized approach to public service delivery is broken', so 'wherever possible we will increase choice' and 'power will be decentralized to the lowest appropriate level'. Such choice will only happen if service delivery is 'opened up to a range of providers of different sizes and different sectors ' (Cm 8145, 2011, 8-9) .
Choice, decentralization and diversity of providers are three core tenets of the proposed reforms.
All the ideas about evidence-based policymaking, managerialism and choice are part ideas like total quality management, red tape bonfires, better consultation, risk management, competency, evidence-based policy, joined-up government, delivery leadership, and now better policymaking. Such initiatives come and go, overlap and ignore each other, leaving behind residues of varying size and style (Hood and Lodge 2007, 59 ).
The syndrome persists because the assumptions behind reforms are not fit for public sector purpose. (Geertz 1973) , through an analysis of their beliefs and everyday practices. As Law (1994, 263) observes, outsiders studying an organization 'are no more able to offer a single and coherent account of the way in which it orders itself' than its managers. So, just as civil servants seek to domesticate the everyday life of their minister, I seek to domesticate the many competing beliefs and practices of the departments.
LESSONS

Methods
I draw on three sources of information: 'the pattern of practice, talk, and considered writing' (Oakeshott 1996, x) . On practice, I observed the office of two ministers and three 7 permanent secretaries for two days each. I also shadowed two ministers and three permanent secretaries for five working days each. On talk, I had repeat interviews with: ten permanent secretaries, five secretaries of state, three ministers, and twenty other officials. On considered writing, I had newspaper reports, copies of speeches and public lectures, and committee and other papers relevant to the meetings I observed.
My interviews and fieldwork observations were for citation but not for attribution without the interviewee's permission. I studied three ministries: the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), the Department for Education and Skills (DfES), and the Department for (Wulff 2002, 117) . I also went to more than one fieldwork site because I was 'studying through'; that is, following events through the 'webs and relations between actors, institutions and discourses across time and space ' (Shore and Wright 1997, 14) . The research methods and the findings are reported in detail in Rhodes (2011) .
Axioms
Political scientists can aspire to 'plausible conjectures'; that is, to making general statements which are plausible because they rest on good reasons and the reasons are good I accept that these axioms oversimplify but I want to dramatize the difference between rational and storytelling reforms.
Coping and the appearance of rule, not strategic planning
At the top of government departments we find a class of political-administrators, not politicians or administrators. They live in a shared world. Their priority and their skills are about surviving in a world of rude surprises. The goal is willed ordinariness. They do not need more risk. They are adrift in an ocean of storms. Only reformers have the luxury of choosing which challenge they will respond to. Ministers and permanent secretaries have to juggle the contradictory demands posed by recurring dilemmas. They must appear to be in control. I incline to Weiss's (1980) notions of decision accretion and knowledge creep. Thus, policy emerges from routine and builds like a coral reef. Similarly, rational policy analysis creeps into the decision process almost by osmosis, by becoming part of the zeitgeist, rather than overt deliberation. Civil service reform is not, therefore, a matter of solving specific problems but of managing unfolding dilemmas and their inevitable unintended consequences. There is no solution but a succession of solutions to problems which are contested and redefined as they are 'solved'. This analysis is an anathema to the would-be reformers of the previous section, but it is the fate of their rational schemes.
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Strategic planning is a clumsy add-on to this world. Its timescale is too long. Its concerns too far removed from the everyday life concerns of its short-stay incumbents. The demands of political accountability and the media spotlight do not pay attention to strategic priorities.
Relatively trivial problems of implementation can threaten a minister's career. Finally, the call for clear roles and responsibilities, for objectives and targets, is an idealized rational model of policymaking largely removed from the messy reality of public policy making.
The limits to the rational model of policy making have been spelt out so often, they need no repetition. Crucially, as practiced, rational analysis is retrospective not prospective. It is used to justify decisions already taken by other means and for other reasons. And the other reasons are usually political ones. There is no obvious reason to prioritize economic rationality over political rationality, rather the converse. I agree with Wildavsky, writing back in 1968 about the then fashionable management reform of PPBS (Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System), when he vigorously argued that 'political rationality is the fundamental kind of reason' it determines 'the decision structures [that] are the source of all decisions (Wildavsky 1968, 393) . So, much government is not about strategy and priorities but the appearance of rule: 'about stability.
Keeping things going, preventing anarchy, stopping society falling to bits. Still being here tomorrow' (Lynn and Jay 1984, 454) . I do not seek, as did the authors of the quote, to make people laugh. In this witticism is much wisdom, not cynicism.
Institutional memory, not internal structures
Reform all too frequently involves splitting up existing units, creating new units, redeploying staff, bringing in outsiders, revamping IT systems. A key unintended consequence is the loss of institutional memory. Pollitt (2007: 173) gives his recipe for eroding institutional memory: rotate staff rapidly, change the IT system frequently, restructure every two years, reward management over other skills, and adopt each new management fad. All three departments met 10 most of these criteria. There was a tacit policy of depleting a proven asset for unproven gains.
Institutional memory is the source of stories; the department's folk psychology, providing the everyday theory and shared languages for storytelling. These stories involve a retelling of yesterday to make sense of today. They explain past practice and events and justify recommendations for the future. It is crucial if the civil service is to tell accurate and reliable stories.
Of course, there is some awareness of the importance of some everyday routines. The
BGI (2010) Service "generalist" is dead'. Instead, they say they want 'the right combination of professionalism, expert skills and subject matter expertise' (Cabinet Office 2012, 23). Where are the political antennae that point out the hole to the minister before he or she falls in? Where are the political skills that pull him or her out of the hole afterwards, and argue that he or she never fell in? Have would-be reformers persuaded ministerial colleagues to forsake the cocoon of willed ordinariness at the top of departments that exists to protect the minister? Private offices exist to domesticate trouble, to defuse problems, and to take the emotion out of a crisis. Protocols are the key to managing this pressurized existence. Everyday routines are unquestioned and unrecognized. In a similar vein, Lindblom (1990) compares professional with lay knowledge to the discomfort of the former. Understandings of how things work around here are embedded not only in the taken for granted routines and rituals of the departmental court but also the beliefs and practices of actors at lower levels of the hierarchy. Not only is such knowledge rarely part of the policy process, it is not valued. Yet it is often crucial to the success of policies especially in their implementation. Although one strand in the British political tradition asserts that 'leaders know best', the track record of much top-down innovation and control does not inspire confidence.
Moreover, when implementation is part of government thinking, it is strangely divorced from everyday knowledge. Pressman and Wildavsky 1984; and Sabatier 1986 ). Curiouser and curiouser, the report states that 'much of this failure has been because policy gets announced before implementation has been fully thought through ' (2012, 18) .
From this statement, do we conclude that ministers delay their history making policy announcements while their civil servants spot snags? Ministers have short tenure. They will not sit around waiting on what they see as mere detail. Probably, they will not be there when the implementation problems arrive. Snag spotting irritates them (Rhodes 2011, 185) . Civil servants are wary of speaking too much truth to power. Even more of a problem, the statement also assumes that civil servants are responsible for implementation when many departments rely on third parties. They have a hands-off, not hands on, link to policy implementation. As Bovens (1998, 46) puts it, they confront the "the problem of many hands"
where responsibility for policy is shared. Everyday lay knowledge would tell policy makers about the limits to implementation, but no one would be listening. Finally, this approach does not privilege managerial rationality or the preferences of managers. Rather, it focuses on the manifold stories of government departments. It seeks to
give voice to the forgotten in the reform literature. The focus is local, micro and actual (Aronoff and Kubik 2013, 25) .
LIMITS
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What are the limits of such an approach for the reform of public administration?
Playing the role of 'social technologists' and using observational fieldwork to produce proposals for civil service reform poses several problems. I consider them under the headings of: roles, relevance, time, evidence, and working with elites (see also Agar 1996; Kedia and Willigen 2005; Rhodes et al 2007; Sillitoe 2006; and Van Willigen 2002) .
There is no agreement on the role of the anthropologist let alone on whether anthropology should be 'relevant' and how that could be achieved. Van Maanen (1978, 345-6) describes his relationship with the police he was observing as: 'a cop buff, a writer of books, an intruder, a student, a survey researcher, a management specialist, a friend, an ally, an asshole, a historian, a recruit and so on'. He was 'part spy, part voyeur, part fan and part member'. Similarly, Kedia and Van Willigen (2005, 11) distinguish between 'policy researcher or research analyst; evaluator; impact assessor, or needs assessor; cultural broker; public participation specialist; and administrator or manager'. Applied anthropology can serve many masters.
For Van Willigen applied anthropology is about providing information for decision makers so they can make rational decisions. Or, more formally, applied anthropology is a 'complex of related, research-based, instrumental methods which produce change or stability in specific cultural systems through the provision of data, initiation of direct action, and/or the formulation of policy' (Van Willigen (2002, 150 and chapter 10) . Not everyone would agree that the task is to help decision makers. For Agar (1996, 27) , 'no understanding of a world is valid without representation of those members' voices'. For him, 'ethnography is populist to the core' and the task is to be 'sceptical of the distant institutions that control local people's lives '. 20 Managers are scarcely sympathetic to such aims. They see anthropologists as 'coming forward with awkward observations' and 'as wishing to preserve "traditional" ways' (Sillitoe 2006, 10) . Managers criticise anthropologists because their findings often failed to conform to expectations held by employers about the causes of problems and their solutions'. They were dismissed as 'irrelevant or disruptive' (Sillitoe 2006, 14) . As Kedia and Van Willigen (2005, 16-20) observe, applied anthropology confronts an acute and recurring moral dilemma 'since the practitioner must negotiate an intricate balance between the interests of the clients who commission the work, and those of the community being studied'. Inevitably, there are issues about whose aims are served by the research, who owns the research results, and individual privacy. Given that observational fieldwork is about decentring an established organization to identify its several voices, its contending beliefs and practices, and its traditions and stories (Bevir and Rhodes 2006) , then the research is never about privileging any one voice. From the viewpoint of the managers, therefore, there is always the potential for disruption and irrelevance.
Given managerial concerns about such anthropological decentring and disruption, it is ironic that my political science colleagues express concern about its conservative outlook. In effect, they claim that by describing life at the top, I justify it. I am too sympathetic to ministers 'bleating about their world as one of high risk and shock' and I seek to 'make the life of the political administrative class more comfortable'. I agree description can spill over into justification and, therefore, seem conservative but that is not my intention. does not have to be the decade long immersion of the lone researcher. There are shortcuts; for example, by using teams of fieldworkers, collaborative working with the client, snapshots across locations and time, and storytelling circles (Czarniawska, 2004, chapter 3) . But getting below and behind the surface of official accounts to provide texture, depth and nuance and opening the consciousness of one group of people to another (Geertz 1988 ) cannot be done overnight. I was lucky -the civil service agreed to my doing 'curiosity research'.
Finally, there is the delicate issue of managing relationships with the elite. I have considered this at length elsewhere (Rhodes et al 2007, chapter 9) but two points bear repetition. I was not studying the powerless. Rather, the research 'subjects' were more powerful than me. They can, and a minority did, refuse interviews, deny access to the organization, declare documents secret, and insist on anonymity for both themselves and their organization. All the interviews and periods of observation took place with informed consent but as the work unfolded I had to negotiate constantly to keep that cooperation. Also, it is all too easy to affect the relationship between yourself and the observed, causing them to behave differently. The aim of the so-called `non-participant' observer is to remain the outsider; 'the professional stranger' (Agar 1996 
CONCLUSIONS
In political science, the dominant tradition is modernist-empiricism with its roots in the natural science model. The argument about blurred genres takes as its starting point the turning away from that model and the idea of law-like generalizations. As Inglis (2000, 112) argues, there has been a lethal attack on modernist-empiricism, and the work of philosophers such as Charles Taylor, Peter Winch and Alasdair McIntyre means that using the methods of the natural sciences in the human sciences is 'comically improper'. Richard Bernstein, Clifford Geertz, and Richard Rorty could be added to a long and growing list of such critics, before mentioning the long-standing hermeneutics tradition of Continental Europe. This 'interpretive turn' raises the problem of what counts as evidence. It might seem obvious that 'not everything that counts can be counted, and not everything that can be counted counts'
(sign hanging in Albert Einstein's office at Princeton), but not when it comes to civil service reform and policy analysis. It is a world of given facts, positive theory and hypothesis testing.
Qualitative data simply does not meet these expectations because it does not count as 23 generalizable evidence. My observational data is evidence as relevant to civil service reform as the evidence conventionally used to support managerialism.
The attempts to impose private sector management beliefs and techniques to increase the economy, efficiency and effectiveness resulted in the civil service reform syndrome. If private sector techniques offer such obvious and available ways to manage, then why is so little implemented across government? It is not because public managers are ill-trained, stupid or venal, but because private sector techniques do not fit the context. Such techniques can be neutered by both bureaucratic and political games, and are subjected to public accountability.
Public sector officials also do not share the same risks and rewards. Similarly, rational meansends analysis is largely removed from the reality of public policy making. Politics, value clashes, interests, cultures, symbolic imperatives, processes and accountability requirements all make the rational actor model untenable in public policy decision-making. Internal reorganization has marginal effects on beliefs, practices and traditions. Chanting the mantras of organizational change and leadership leaves most of the organization untouched. The choice agenda ignores the political context confronting ministers and senior civil servants.
'Hands off' advice is an anathema to the British governing elite that has always known best.
The rational, managerial approach has predominated since 1968, producing little beyond the civil service reform syndrome. We do not need more of the same. We need a different approach to reform. The storytelling approach is a contender. A bottom-up approach to reform rooted in the everyday knowledge of departments is a lone voice in this wilderness, but it can hardly do worse. It holds out the prospect of reforms that command legitimacy at lower levels of the bureaucracy even if they do not directly serve the interests of ministers and permanent secretaries. Therein lies the rub. We must never forget that civil service reform is 24 about the constitutional and political role of public administration in the polity; it is not about better management.
